Civil actions for indemnification of damages due trademark and patent infringement are unusual if compared with the number of administrative infringement actions. The main statutory provisions regarding payment of damages are articles 221 and 221 Bis of the Industrial Property Law, enacted in 1994.

Section 221 Bis of the Industrial Property Law states that the amount of the indemnification due violation of the rights stipulated in the statute shall be no less than the equivalent of 40% of the retail price of the goods or services sold or rendered in violation of such rights. The claim for damages has to be filed with a court of common jurisdiction.

A landmark decision was the 2004 jurisprudencia or binding precedent 1a./J. 13/2004[1] from the Mexican Supreme Court (MSC). The binding precedent was a consequence of contradictory decisions issued by lower court, namely, if it was necessary to have a final infringement decision issued by the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (MPTO) as a prerequisite to file a civil action for damages (read our article  Damages claims due patent and trademark infringement).

After the binding precedent 1a./J. 13/2004, the MSC has issued a handful of decisions in about the civil action of indemnification of damages associated to patent and trademark infringement (copyright too), none of them binding. From the decisions of the MSC, I have extracted a few basic guidelines:

a) It is necessary to have a final infringement decision from the MPTO before filing a civil action for indemnification of damages.

b) The court where the civil lawsuit has been filed cannot review the MPTO’s decision about the infringement.

c) The plaintiff has to prove, in the trial, that the infringement caused actual damages.

d) The plaintiff must also prove the cause-effect relation between the infringement and the actual damages.

e) Civil actions for damages that involve trademark or patent rights originated from a contractual dispute (such as a breach of a license agreement), or that are not related to a cause of administrative infringement (i.e. a criminal case), do not require a previous infringement decision from the MPTO.

Issues identified as a), b), c) and d) were stated in the 2004 binding precedent from the MSC. As a consequence, and until very recently, I thought there would be little controversy about them in indemnification cases associated to trademark and patent infringement.

On December 2017, the Judicial Journal of the Federation published a non-binding decision from the MSC, regarding the constitutional validity of article 221 Bis of the Industrial Property Law[2]. Basically, the MSC ruled that the lack of identification of the specific industrial property rights that, if infringed, would allow the claim of payment of damages provided by article 221 Bis of the Industrial Property Law, does not make the statutory provision unconstitutional.

Of course, the precedent of the MSC was very important, and confirmed the standing of the Court on different technical issues (namely the ones identified as a), b), c) and d) above) around the action for indemnification of damages because of patent and trademark infringement. However, making a little research, I found that the underlying civil case (from 2013) was even more interesting because the lower tribunal colegiado or court of appeals disagreed with some critical positions that the MSC has adopted since 2004 in different decisions.

Because of a number of technical reasons, the MSC did not review the merits of the underlying civil case in the decision published in 2017, only the constitutionality of article 221 Bis of the Industrial Property Law.

The underlying civil case was decided by the Octavo Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito or Eight Panel of the Federal Court of Appeals in Mexico City (Eight Panel)[3] on May 8, 2013. (Update February 27, 2019: The case number was D.C. 153/2013. The public version of the full decision (in Spanish) may be downloaded here).

The Eight Panel ruled that the precedent 1a./J. 13/2004 of the MSC was binding only about having a final infringement decision from the MPTO as a prerequisite for a civil action for indemnification of damages. Other questions stated in the precedent are just “orientations” (unfortunately the Eight Panel did not state a statutory provision, precedent or legal theory supporting the ruling).

Therefore, the Eight Panel decided that, on a damages case based on section 221 Bis of the Industrial Property Law, the plaintiff does not have to prove actual damages or the cause-effect relation between the infringement (previously declared by the MPTO) and the actual damages. The plaintiff only has to prove the amount of the sales at retail price of the infringing product/service, and calculate the equivalent to 40% in order to obtain the amount that, as a minimum, the plaintiff has the right to collect as indemnification from the infringer/defendant.

If other federal panels and state courts follow the Eight Panel’s example, we may see in the next years a revival of successful lawsuits for indemnification of damages due to patent and trademark infringement in Mexico. It will also be interesting to see if the MSC will have something to say about the non-binding “orientations” that the Eight Panel and potentially other courts will start finding in the binding precedents of the MSC.

[1] “PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL. ES NECESARIA UNA PREVIA DECLARACIÓN POR PARTE DEL INSTITUTO MEXICANO DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL, SOBRE LA EXISTENCIA DE INFRACCIONES EN LA MATERIA PARA LA PROCEDENCIA DE LA ACCIÓN DE INDEMNIZACIÓN POR DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS”, at Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Ninth Period, Vol XIX, May 2004, page 365 (Electronic version: https://sjf.scjn.gob.mx/sjfsist/Paginas/DetalleGeneralV2.aspx?Epoca=1e3e10000000000&Apendice=1000000000000&Expresion=1a.%2FJ.%252013%2F2004&Dominio=Rubro,Texto&TA_TJ=2&Orden=1&Clase=DetalleTesisBL&NumTE=1&Epp=20&Desde=-100&Hasta=-100&Index=0&InstanciasSeleccionadas=6,1,2,50,7&ID=181491&Hit=1&IDs=181491&tipoTesis=&Semanario=0&tabla=&Referencia=&Tema=. Date of review: January 14, 2019).

[2] “PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL. EL ARTÍCULO 221 BIS DE LA LEY RESPECTIVA NO CONTRAVIENE EL PRINCIPIO DE SEGURIDAD JURÍDICA” at Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Décima Época, Book 49, Vol I, December 2017, page 437 (Electronic version: https://sjf.scjn.gob.mx/sjfsist/Paginas/DetalleGeneralV2.aspx?Epoca=1e3e10000000000&Apendice=1000000000000&Expresion=%25202015750&Dominio=Localizacion&TA_TJ=2&Orden=1&Clase=DetalleTesisBL&NumTE=1&Epp=20&Desde=-100&Hasta=-100&Index=0&InstanciasSeleccionadas=6,1,2,50,7&ID=2015750&Hit=1&IDs=2015750&tipoTesis=&Semanario=0&tabla=&Referencia=&Tema=. Date of review: January 19, 2019).

[3] While all decisions from the different federal courts and panels are of public record and everybody may request a copy (with personal information redacted), not all decisions are published as precedents. It is up to each court and panel deciding if the case is relevant enough to be published in the Judicial Journal of the Federation. The decision of the underlying civil case rendered by the Eight Panel on May, 2013, was not published. (Update February 27, 2019: You may download the public version of the full decision (In Spanish) here)

La entrada Damages claims due infringement of trademarks and patents in Mexico. Who has the final saying? se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

As I reported in an earlier post (see Mexico starts a new era in Trademark Law (the amendments of May, 2018)), last May 18, 2018, the Official Journal of the Federation published important amendments to the Mexican Industrial Property Law, particularly in the field of trademarks. The amendments became in force on August 10, 2018.

In general, the changes had a favorable reception. However, some amendments were not welcome. One of the changes, that I did not like, refers to the reintroduction of the burden of filing a declaration of actual and effective use of the trademark after the third anniversary of issuance of the registration, in order to keep it alive.

As background, the Trademarks and Inventions Statute of 1976 stated that trademark owners had to file a statement and evidence of use after the third year of registration, and again when renewing. This burden was deleted in the 1991 Industrial Property Law (See Is it neccesary to file evidence of use of a trademark in Mexico to keep it alive?). Now, almost 27 years later, it reappears.

The amended articles 128 and 152, paragraph III, of the Industrial Property Law, provide that the owner of a trademark registration must file a statement of actual and effective use of the trademark after three years of registration. The window to file the statement is three months, counted from the date of the third anniversary of issuance of the registration. Failure to file the statement of actual and effective use of the registered trademark would result in the ipso iure abandonment of the registration.

If the trademark registration lists goods or services different from the ones that have been actually identified with the trademark in Mexico, the declaration of use may not be filed and the registration will become abandoned too.

The burden to file the statement of actual and effective use affects owners of nationally filed trademark registrations and owners of Madrid International Registrations, if the registration or declaration of protection in Mexico were issued on August 10, 2018, and thereafter.

(Update March 7, 2019: The declaration of actual and effective use is also due when renewing the local trademark registration or the international trademark registration. Read more here.)

(Update March 14, 2019: Applicants must be careful when filing the declaration of actual and effective use, either at the third year of registration or when renewing; the coverage of the trademark registration shall be limited to the goods or services stated in the declaration of use, although it is questionable whether such a limitation is legal.)

The reasons behind the new burden to file a statement of actual and effective use are unclear, but the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office will charge a government fee of about US$75.00 for each declaration of use filed.

Although it is evident that the new burden will apply to Mexican trademark registrations issued on August 10, 2018, and thereafter, there are concerns about the possible ex post facto enforcement of the amended stipulations to trademark registrations issued before August 10, 2018, especially the ones issued after August 10, 2015. Some lawyers say that amended articles 128 and 152, paragraph III of the Industrial Property Law may be applied ex post facto, thus if trademark owners of registrations issued after August 10, 2015, do not file the statement of actual and effective use, the registration will become abandoned. Of course, these lawyers are sending communications advising owners of registered trademarks issued between August 10, 2015, and August 10, 2018, to file the statement of use.

In my opinion, there are no grounds to claim that amended articles 128 and 152, paragraph III, of the Industrial Property Law may be enforced ex post facto.

Article 14 of the Constitution states, as a rule, that no law shall be enforced ex post facto. There are two exceptions:

1. If the new law expressly provides that it shall be enforced ex post facto, as some precedents explain[1]. If such an ex post facto enforcement of the law harms an acquired right (opposed to a potential right), it may be declared unconstitutional. If it benefits the recipient of the law, then it would be a valid ex post facto enforcement.

In the case of amended articles 128 and 152, paragraph III, of the Industrial Property Law, there is no stipulation in the amended statute or transitory provisions, allowing the ex post facto enforcement of any of the amended articles. Therefore, no amended provisions, especially the ones regarding the burden to file a declaration of use, may be applied ex post facto to trademark and slogan registrations issued before August 10, 2018.

2. The second exception that allows the ex post facto application of a law is that the amended provisions improve the general civil rights of a person, or benefits a person subject to a punitive criminal, tax or administrative procedure. Only in these cases, an amended provision may be enforced ex post facto even if the law does not expressly authorized such an application.

Enacting a statutory provision stating a new burden to trademark owners to keep the registration alive, with nothing in return, is not a benefit and does not improve anything for rights holders, so I fail to see how amended articles 128 and 152, paragraph III, of the Industrial Property Law may be automatically enforced ex post facto.

Finally, Transitory Article Two of the amended provisions states that trademark applications and oppositions filed before the amendments became enforceable (August 10, 2018), shall be prosecuted and decided according to the statutory provisions in force when the application was filed.

The above is actually a relevant provision, even if it is unrelated to the burden of filing a statement of actual and effective use of the registered trademark. Unlike substantive rights, parties in a procedure do not have acquired rights for future actions and terms within the procedure; amendments to procedural laws cause that the amended provisions become applicable to ongoing examinations, unless otherwise stipulated in the statute. Without Transitory Article Two, ongoing trademark and slogan application procedures would have continued under the new amended procedural rules, and that could have been messy. Transitory Article Two allows the MPTO to continue the examination of applications filed before August 10, 2018, under the old rules.

In summary, I believe that there is no reason to state that the filing of a statement of actual and effective use of a Mexican registered trademark, when it becomes three years old, is compulsory for trademark registrations issued before August 10, 2018, in order to avoid the ipso iure abandonment. However, the statement of actual and effective use (and the government fee associated with such a statement) will have to be filed simultaneously with the renewal, regardless if the registration was issued before or after August 10, 2018.

I think that the reason why some colleagues are advising clients to file statements of use, in spite that their trademarks were issued before August 1, 2018, is that many lawyers do not fully understand what the ex post facto application of the law is and how it works.

[1] “RETROACTIVIDAD DE LA LEY”, at Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Quinta Época, Tomo VI, page 726; “RETROACTIVIDAD DE LA LEY (TEORÍA DE LOS DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS) (LEGISLACIONES DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL Y DE YUCATÁN)”, at Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Quinta Época, Tomo LXXVIII, page 2435; “RETROACTIVIDAD. CUANDO ES JURIDICA LA APLICACION RETROACTIVA DE LA LEY”, at Semanario Judicial de la Federación, Quinta Época, Tomo CXXXII, page 304.

La entrada The new statement of use of registered trademarks in Mexico se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

Under some extraordinary circumstances, it is possible to file an appeal against a decision of the MPTO with a Federal District Judge, but this not the rule and the appeal I will refer to in this article is the appeal with the FCTAA.

One of the rules of the appeals with the FCTAA has been that the appellant and the appellee may file new arguments and evidence that were not previously filed with the MPTO; we call this rule litis abierta.

The filing of new arguments and/or evidence in the appeal has caused the FCTAA to revoke some decisions issued by the MPTO, fully legal and consistent to what the parties argued and proved. Nevertheless, not all courts of appeals agree on how the litis abierta rule should be applied. The Fourth Court of Appeals in Mexico City was against the filing of new evidence of use in appeals associated to cancellation actions against registered trademarks due non-use.

A new binding precedent from the Supreme Court (73/2013)[1], published in July 2013, has set some limits to the possibility of filing new evidence in appeals, although the language the court used in drafting this precedent is ambiguous. Although the precedent does not affect the right to file new arguments in the appeal with the FCTAA, the court stated that it would not be valid to declare the invalidation of a decision based on the analysis of evidence that the appellant did not file in the original procedure in spite of having the obligation and being capable to legally do so.

The precedent was issued to solve contradictory rulings between courts of appeals. Although origin of the contradictory decisions and the precedent itself were associated to tax cases, it construes a statutory provision that applies to all appeals filed with the FCTAA, thus it will impact IP cases.

In my opinion, the language the court uses in the precedent is a little ambiguous and it raises some questions. I am concerned about the obligation of filing evidence. Under Mexican law, filing evidence is a burden, but not an obligation. Actually, some lawyers believe that proving is a right. So what did the court mean about having the obligation of filing evidence?

I think that filing evidence becomes an obligation when the government agency, i.e. the MPTO, issues a specific order requesting one of the parties to exhibit certain document in the procedure. If the MPTO issue an order requesting a specific document, then there was an obligation to file it. If the party that received the order to file the document did not do it, according to this binding precedent, it can’t file it later as evidence in the appeal. Further, any document that was not subject matter of an order from the MPTO to be filed in the invalidation/cancellation/infringement proceeding, may be filed as new evidence in the appeal, because there was no obligation to file it in the previous procedure.

However, I think the courts of appeals will construe the precedent 73/2013 in a broader way. While continuing accepting the filing of new arguments, I think the courts of appeals will decide against the filing of all new evidence in the appeal. As an example, the Tenth Court of Appeals in Mexico City construed the precedent 73/2013 in such a broad way when deciding the final appeal (amparo directo) DA 552/2013.

The litis abierta rule applicable to appeals with the FCTAA will probably continue evolving, and I hope the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court itself will publish new precedents clarifying and narrowing the broad construction of this relatively new precedent.

La entrada The Mexican Supreme Court sets limits to the filing of new evidence in appeals. se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

Before the amendment, if an applicant wanted to claim priority, it had to state the application serial number of the claimed priority in the Mexican application and file a certified copy of the priority application with the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (MPTO) within a three month term counted from the filing of the trademark application in Mexico in order to have the priority claim acknowledged.

Now, the applicant only has to state the priority application serial number in the Mexican application – and enter the government fee for the acknowledgement of a priority- to secure the priority right.

If the Mexican trademark application lists more products than the ones stated in the priority, the priority would be acknowledged only for the coincidental goods. If an applicant claims a non-existent priority and the MPTO issues a registration with such  a false claim, the trademark registration may be declared invalid.

The new simplified rule for priority trademark applications only benefits applications filed after June 11, 2011. This new rule should significantly reduce the cost of filing trademark applications with priority claim, given that the trademark agent will have one less deadline to worry about.

Regrettably, while the procedure for Mexican trademark applications is evolving to require fewer formalities, the patent application procedure has virtually remained the same since 1994.

For example, it is no longer necessary to file a power of attorney with the MPTO when filing a trademark application, but such formality has been maintained for patent applications. Now, the applicant does not have to file a certified copy of the priority application in the case of trademarks, but the formality persists for patents.

Further, the amended Rules expressly state that if the applicant files the priority document without translation, the applicant has a two months term to file the Spanish translations and the MPTO has not have to issue an office action requesting the translation; otherwise, the priority claim would not be acknowledged. However, the precedents from the Federal Court of Tax and Administrative Affairs state that it is illegal for the MPTO to refuse acknowledging a priority claim because the applicant did not file the Spanish translation of the document within the two months term, if the MPTO did not issue an office action requesting the translation ^1. .

The MPTO has not explained the reasons why the procedural rules and provisions regarding patents are not following the less formalistic trend of the trademark-related procedures. I do not see a technical reason, and I may only speculate that the people in charge of patents and the people in charge of trademarks believe that, rather than a Mexican Patent and Trademark Office, there is a Mexican Patent Office and a Mexican Trademark Office.

¹ Precedent “Patent. The Auhtority has the obligation to request the translation that was not filed with the patent application” – Page 463, Revista del Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa or Journal of the Federal Court of Tax and Administrative Affairs, Sixth Era, Volume 26, February 2010 (VI-TASR-EPI-222).

La entrada Mexico simplifies the acknowledgement of priority claims in trademark matters se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

The amendments corrected a few inconsistencies between the Rules and the Industrial Property Statute (the Statute), adjusted a few regulations to follow some repeated rulings of the Federal Court of Tax and Administrative Affairs and simplified the acknowledgement of priority claims in trademark matters.

CHANGES TO THE RULES OF WORD MARKS

I think that the most important amendment to the Rules refers to word marks.

In Mexico, only graphic symbols are acknowledged as trademarks, thus only graphics may be registered to obtain exclusivity rights on them. Depending on the claims stated in the application and the characteristics of the mark, there are four kinds of registered trademarks: nominativas or word-marks, innominadas or design-only marks, mixtas or word+design marks and tridimensionales or three-dimensional marks.

Word-marks consist of literal elements only, such as a word, a phrase or a combination of numbers and/or letters. One issue that neither the Statute nor the Rules clarified was if symbols, such as &, @ and +, and written signs that do not exist in Spanish, such as the ‘ (apostrophe), could be registered as part of a word-mark.

The amendment to the Rules of June 10 seeks to clarify, in a restrictive and confusing way, what can be included in a word mark.

The amended last paragraph of section 56 of the Rules, now states that “word marks and slogans may only include letters or words taken from the roman alphabet, western Arabic numbers and those written signs that would help the correct understanding of the mark”.

What surprised me more of the amendment, was the used of the expression “Roman alphabet”. In Mexico the official language is Spanish, and Spanish speakers use the Spanish -not the Roman- alphabet.

I believe that the new section 56 of the Rules now clearly exclude symbols such as &, #, @, mathematical symbols (+, /, >, <) and currency symbols ($, €), among others, from being included in trademark applications for word-marks.

Further, the amended section 56 of the Rules makes it very clear that word marks may not be expressed in characters taken from non-Latin alphabets, such as Greek, Hebrew, Chinese, Arabic, Cyrillic, etc.

The reform does not prohibit the registration of trademarks that include mathematical symbols or letters from non-Latin alphabets. However, such trademarks may not be registered as word marks, given that the Rules now implicitly consider such characters as a sort of drawing. Therefore, trademarks with non-Latin Characters or other symbols as the ones explained above have to be filed as design-only marks (innominadas) or word+design (mixtas) marks.

This is a quite relevant change. If a trademark is registered as a word-mark, the trademark owner may use it in any font, size and color, and such use would be regarded as use of the registered trademark for maintenance purposes. If a trademark is filed as word+design or design-only, the registrant must attach a print of the trademark to the application; if the registration is issued, the trademark owner must use the trademark as registered, so the use may be acknowledged as valid use of the registered trademark for maintenance purposes, including renewal.

I did not understand the distinction in the amended section 56 of the Rules about “written signs that would help the correct understanding of the mark”. What is the point of the distinction? If there are written signs that would help the correct understanding of the mark, then there could be written signs that would not help the correct understanding of the mark, or worst, that help the incorrect understanding of the mark?

My opinion is that there are no written signs included in the mark that help the correct understanding of the trademark. Written signs included in the mark are not intended to helping understanding the mark; they are part of the mark, thus all orthographic signs should be allowed to be included in word-marks. I am sure that among the written signs that will not have a problem to be part of word-marks are the punctuation marks, the exclamation (¡ !) and interrogation points (¿ ?), the diaeresis and the accent, although doubts and objections about the dash and the apostrophe are likely.

Other unclear, and somehow odd, issue involves trademarks that evolved from the Latin alphabet but do not actually belong to it, i.e. “Æ”, “Ç”, “Ø”, etc. Given that a word mark may only include characters from the Roman alphabet, the first reaction could be that a trademark that includes such letters may not be registered as a word-mark.

However, there are letters in Spanish that evolved from the Roman alphabet, but do not actually belong to it, such as “J”, “W” and most notably the “Ñ”. There is no question that the “Ñ” belongs to the Spanish alphabet, but undoubtedly is was not a part of the Roman alphabet; further, the classic Latin alphabet did not include the “J” and “W”.

Certainly, it would be ridiculous stating that, as a consequence of the amendment of section 56 of the Rules, words that include the “Ñ”, “W” or “J” may not be registered as word-marks any long. Then, the new section 56 of the Rules should be understood in the sense that all words including letters that evolved from the Latin alphabet should be allowed to be part of word-marks, naturally including the “Ñ”, “W” and “J”, but also “ß”, “Å”, “Ŝ”, “Ų” and all other letters that do not exist in Spanish but in other languages that that evolved from Roman characters too.

I am not sure if the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office will use a narrow concept of “Roman Alphabet” (excluding the registration as word-marks of trademarks that use the “Ñ”, “J” or “W”) or liberal (including each and all letters that developed from Roman, regardless if they belong to the Spanish alphabet or not), but it would not the first time that a rule or statutory provision is constructed in a way different of what the Government or the Congress meant. As example, there is the case of the extension of life of pipe-line patents (see The extension of Life of Patents in Mexico)and the inclusion of formulation patents in the linkage system situated in section 67 Bis of the Rules (see The Mexican Supreme Court expands the linkage system to prevent patent infringement). It would be odd and regretful, but I would not be surprised if in the future, Wikipedia becomes the authorized source to know what trademarks may be registered as word-marks in Mexico and which ones do not.

The Mexican government would have avoided problems if, instead of using the phrase “Roman alphabet”, they would have used the expression “Spanish alphabet”.

Another topic that makes me uneasy is the reason behind the restrictive amendment to section 56 of the Rules. Why the Executive Branch decided to restrict the possibility of obtaining word-mark registrations to those trademarks using Latin characters only? In a global economy, especially in such an open economy as the Mexican, it does not make much sense to close the possibilities of giving full protection to trademarks originated in other nations just because they are written different.

Further, why denying registration as word-mark of trademarks that use non-orthographic characters (the +, @ and &, for example)? I do not see a technical reason for narrowing the kind of characters that a word-mark may include, especially in the case of symbols that are widely used in Mexico.

I also think that the Administration lost a good opportunity to clarify if it is valid disclaiming words, phrases or letters from word-mark trademark applications. It also waste the opportunity of explaining whether the registration of a design-only or word+design trademark filed in black and white or grays gives the trademark owner the right to use the registered design in any color or color combination, in spite of having being registered in white and black or grays.

In general, I am in favor of any amendment to the Rules or the Statute that provides more certainty about the procedures and substantive rights, even if I do not like the amendment itself. Therefore, the upside of the amendment of section 56 of the Rules is that now it is clear that trademarks including or consisting of non-orthographic symbols and signs, and marks written in non-Latin characters cannot be registered as word-marks in Mexico. Now we have to clarify, and probably the courts will do it, how narrow or liberal is going to be the concept of “Roman Alphabet” that Mexican lawyers will have to use in trademark law to determine if a trademark may be registered as word-mark.

Finally, an issue that should concern Mexican practitioners is the potential conflict between the new Mexican Rules and the Paris Convention, in connection with priority-based trademark applications for word-marks that include letters or signs that may not be registered in Mexico, under the amended Rules, as word-marks.

La entrada Amendments to the Rules Governing Registration of Word-Marks in Mexico se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

In my opinion, the ad-hoc procedure is too burdensome for trademark owners, causing a very small number of applications for the ad-hoc acknowledgement of trademarks as well-known or famous in Mexico. I also stated that the limited benefits of the ad-hoc acknowledgement of a trademark as well-known and the high could also discourage applicants from applying for such acknowledgment.

Although I still maintain my opinions about the ad-hoc procedure, after I wrote the post, the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office have issued a small number of ad-hoc acknowledgments of well-known and famous trademarks.

The following trademarks have been acknowledged as famous in Mexico, through the ad-hoc procedure:

Trademark: “ANDREA”
Date of decision: November 4, 2008
Application serial No. 2197/2007
Owner: Fábricas de Calzado Andrea, S.A de C.V.
Status. Famous

Trademark: “CINEPOLIS”
Date of decision: November 20, 2008
Application serial No. 1256/2008
Owner: Cinemas de la República, S.A. de C.V.
Status: Famous

Trademark: “INTEL”
Date of decision: July 31, 2009
Application serial No. 1577/2008
Owner: Intel Corporation
Status: Famous

Trademark: “RED BULL”
Date of decision: February 19, 2010
Application serial No. 2284/2008
Owner: Red Bull GmbH
Status: Famous

Trademark: “MARINELA”
Date of decision: March 12, 2010
Application serial No. 103/2009
Owner: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
Status. Famous

Trademark: “GANSITO”
Date of decision: March 12, 2010
Application serial No. 101/2009
Owner: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
Status: Famous

Trademark: “BIMBO”
Date of decision: April 23, 2010
Application serial No. 100/2009
Owner: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
Status: Famous

The following trademarks have been acknowledged as well-known in Mexico, through the ad-hoc procedure:

Trademark: “BARCEL”
Date of decision: March 22, 2010
Application serial No. 102/2009
Owner: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
Status: Well-known

Trademark: “RICOLINO”
Date of decision: April 5, 2010
Application serial No. 104/2009
Owner: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
Status: Well-known

Trademark: “PRITT”
Date of decision: June 30, 2010
Application serial No. 638/2009
Owner: Henkel AG & Co. KGAA
Status: Well-known

Of course, the above lists do not show all the trademarks that have been, or could be, regarded as well-known or famous in Mexico. It is limited to those registered trademarks that have been considered, as of August 5, 2010, as well-known or famous in Mexico through the ad-hoc procedure provided by section 98 bis-1 of the Mexican Industrial Property Law. Other trademarks have been acknowledged as well-known (and famous I assume, although I am not aware of such case) as a consequence of an invalidation or infringement actions, or just because the examiner believed they were famous or well-known when objecting or rejecting a trademark application form a third party, even if there was no previous procedure deciding that that mark was well-known or famous in Mexico.

Update March 2013: An updated list of trademarks acknowledged as well-known or famous, through the ad-hoc procedure, until January 2013 is available here.

La entrada Registered trademarks acknowledged as well-known or famous in Mexico through the ad-hoc procedure se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

Before the 2010 amendments, many activities associated to the infringement of IP rights in Mexico were already punished with extreme severity. For example, the willful production, distribution and importation of goods bearing counterfeited trademarks in commercial scale are delitos graves or felonies, thus the defendant is not allowed to be free on bail during the trial. In the same sense, the willful non-authorized reproduction of works protected by copyright in commercial scale is a felony too.

However, in all cases, in order to start an investigation, the holder of the copyright or registered trademark copyright had to file a querella or formal complaint. A characteristic of the crimes that require querella is that the right holder may stop the investigation or the trial by withdrawing the charges (perdón in Spanish).

The querella requirement could obstacle an investigation; for example, when officials of the Customs Agency or the General Attorney Office found and seized a shipment of counterfeited goods or illegal copies of works, without a querella, there was no justification to maintain the seizure of goods or authority to continue the investigation. Further, the formalities that have to fulfill a power of attorney required to file a querella can be very difficult to accomplish for foreign entities. As a result, a federal judge could dismiss a trial because the power of attorney of the representative of the right holder was missing some formal requirement.

As I said before, in the case of crimes that need a formal complaint, the copyright or trademark owner could terminate the investigation or even the trial with a perdón or withdrawal of charges. This possibility allowed the trademark or copyright holder to negotiate a settlement with the defendant, although this sort of negotiations often discouraged, even upset, the officials of the General Attorney Office.

Now, with the June 2010 amendment, many -not all- IP related crimes (most of them associated to copyright) will be investigated ex-officio.

In the copyright field, for example, willfully producing, reproducing, importing, transporting, distributing, selling (in a store) or leasing copies of copyright protected works, with commercial purposes and without authorization, is not only a felony but also will be investigated ex-officio. On the other hand, willfully selling unauthorized copies of copyright-protected works in the streets, with commercial purpose, is a crime that now will be investigated ex-officio, although it is not a felony.

In the trademark field, the June 2010 amendment did not change most of the crimes associated with trademark counterfeiting provided in the statute. Most cases of trademark counterfeiting remain being felonies, but they still need the formal complaint or querella filed by the trademark owner in order to be investigated.

Nevertheless, as a consequence of the June 2010 amendment, willfully offering in sale goods bearing counterfeited trademarks, in the streets with commercial purposes, is now a crime that may be investigated ex-officio although, paradoxically, it is not a felony.

The Federal Congress also amended some provisions regarding the preliminary measures that a trademark, patent or copyright holder may request from the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (MPTO) to stop infringing activities, namely the requirements that the defendant must fulfill to lift such measures.

The most usual way to oppose infringement of IP rights –including most copyright infringement cases- is the administrative infringement action, filed with the MPTO. The MPTO has authority to issue preliminary measures. The preliminary measures may include the seizure of infringing products and an order to the infringer to stop the production of infringing products and recall the merchandise already in hands of distributors.

In order to obtain the preliminary measures, among other requirements, the defendant must file a bond. The purpose of the bond is to guarantee the payment of the actual damages that the preliminary damages may cause to the defendant in case the MPTO decides there was no infringement.

The defendant is allowed to lift the preliminary measures and continue it business as usual, by filing another bond. The purpose of the bond is to guarantee the payment of the damages that the defendant’s activities may cause to the plaintiff.

In practice, the MPTO has not enough data, if any at all, about the amount of the possible damages that the preliminary measures may cause to the alleged infringer, thus the MPTO sets the amount of the bond at it own discretion. Sometimes, the plaintiff files the bond with the MPTO before it accepts to issue them; if it is high, there is a good chance that the MPTO will accept it, although technically it is an arguable practice.

If after the enforcement of the preliminary measures, the MPTO believes that the amount of the bond is too low, it has authority to request the plaintiff to increase the bond, within a three or five days term. Failure of the plaintiff to increase the bond would result in the lift of the preliminary measures.

Once that the preliminary measures have been enforced, the alleged infringer has the right to lift them, y filing another bond. The purpose of this bond is guaranteeing the payment of the damages that the alleged infringing activities may cause to the plaintiff. The practice of the MPTO was to set the amount of the defendant’s bond in twice the amount of the bond filed by the plaintiff.

Now, the amended statute stipulates that the bond that the defendant may file shall be 40% higher than the bond filed by the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the MPTO keeps authority to request the increase of the amount of the bonds filed by the plaintiff or defendant, in case it considers that their amounts are not high enough to guarantee the payment of the damages.

Finally, it is now an administrative infringement that the patent holder, or the recorded licensee (if the recorded license does not provide against the filing of infringement actions against third parties), files an infringement action against a third party, if there was an earlier final decision ruling that there was no patent infringement involving the same cause of infringement.

From my perspective, this new cause of infringement is odd, and I can only understand it as a way of refraining innovative pharmaceutical companies from harassing generics manufacturers with constant infringement actions repeating the same causes of infringement, assuming of course that the efforts of the patent holders to enforce their patent rights can be generally qualified as ‘harassment’.

The amendments to the Federal Criminal Code suggest that there is an intention to increase the fight against piracy, although it also shows lack of a coherent strategy, given the different treatment to crimes associated to trademarks and those related to copyright, and the inconsistencies in each field.

Only time will tell if the will to combat piracy is real, or only a measure to cool down Mexico’s trade partners, mainly the United States, who kept Mexico is the Watch List of the 2010 Special 301 Report.

La entrada Amendments to the Mexican statutes toughens (and softens) fight against piracy and IP infringement se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

The purpose of this post is offer a basic explanation about precedents in Mexico and their effectiveness in IP-related cases.

When I say “precedent”, I am referring to a published decision issued either by one of the salas or chambers of the Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa or Federal Court of Tax and Administrative Affairs (FCTAA), a tribunal colegiado de circuito court of appeals or the Supreme Court. It does not mean that there are no precedents from the MPTO. The MPTO is the first instance in most patent and trademark infringement or invalidation cases, so of course there are precedents, but they are not reported or collected. Mexican lawyers learn about the precedents of the MPTO from our own experience and interchange of ideas with other lawyers and sometimes with the MPTO’s officials. Although the MPTO does not have to follow its own precedents, it always has to state the statutory provisions applicable in each case and explain the reasons of all the decisions it issues.

About the decisions of the courts, it is necessary to distinguish different situations.

First. All the decisions from the federal courts (Mexico is a federal republic, so there are also state courts; the availability of decisions from state courts vary from state to state) become public shortly after they are issued, although the information about the involved parties may not be available in most cases. This situation makes it difficult locating certain decisions if you do not have information about the case number and the court that issued the decision you are looking for.

Second. The decisions of the juzgados de distrito or federal district courts and tribunals unitarios de circuito or higher federal courts are not reported or collected, thus there are almost no references to district courts or higher federal courts as source of precedents.

Third. When a court of appeals, a chamber of the FCTAA or the Supreme Court considers that the legal issues involved in a case are particularly relevant, it may decide to prepare an abstract about the ruling (we call it tesis) and publish it in a collection of precedents issued every month: the Semanario Judicial de la Federación or Weekly Judicial Journal of the Federation (it is no longer weekly, but it kept the name) in the case of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, and the Revista del Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa or Journal of the Federal Court of Tax and Administrative Affairs in the case of the chambers of the FCTAA. These published rulings constitute the precedents.

The abstract of the ruling includes the identification of the issuing court and the case number, so it is relatively easy to obtain a copy of the actual decision and get a deeper knowledge about the reasoning behind the precedent.

In a broad sense, the collection of published precedents is called jurisprudencia; in a more restrictive and technical sense, only the binding precedents are jurisprudencia. Jurisprudencia is often translated into English as ‘jurisprudence’, although the concept is much narrower under Mexican law.

Fourth. In general terms, a precedent becomes binding or jurisprudencia when the ruling has been confirmed in five consecutive decisions –in the case of courts of appeals and the Supreme Court-. A decision may also become binding when different courts of appeals, or the two specialized chambers of the Supreme Court, render contradictory rulings about the same legal issue and the Supreme Court decides which ruling must prevail.

In the case of the FCTAA, it is divided in different chambers of three judges each. There is one chamber specialized in intellectual property matters that decides most appeals against the decisions of the MPTO and the Mexican Copyright Office. The specialized chamber of the FCTAA may publish precedents, but only the precedents of the Highest Chamber of the FCTAA may become binding, if and when a ruling has been confirmed by three or five consecutive decisions, or when it decides the prevailing ruling in the case of contradictory decisions between different chambers of the FCTAA.

Fifth. A precedent may become binding for lower courts, but not for higher or equal-ranked courts. The binding precedents from the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals are binding for all the chambers of the FCTAA.

The MPTO is not a court (even if it acts like one in infringement and invalidation cases) but an administrative entity. Therefore, the MPTO has no actual obligation to follow the binding precedents issued by the courts, although it usually tries to adjust its decisions to such binding rulings.

Further, it is very usual in the Mexican practice –the MPTO, courts and lawyers included- to rely on the authority of some non-binding precedents to justify decisions, opinions and claims.

La entrada A general view about precedents in Mexico se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

For many years, a usual complaint from patent owners of pharmaceutical products was that the Mexican FDA –Comisión Federal para la Protección contra Riesgos Sanitarios, better know by its acronym COFEPRIS- was encouraging patent infringement by issuing marketing authorizations for patent-infringing drugs.

On 2003, the President amended the Reglamento de la Ley de la Propiedad Industrial or Rules of the Industrial Property Law and the Reglamento de Insumos para la Salud or Rules for Health Supplies to create a “link” between the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (MPTO) and the Mexican FDA.

According to the amended Rules of the Industrial Property Law, the MPTO must publish every six months an updated list of patented drugs, identified by the name of the active ingredient. The list must include the names of the patentee and recorded licensee (if any), the term of the patent, among some other information about the protected drug. The idea of the list, widely known as the “List of Patented Medicines”, is to inform the public, and especially the Mexican FDA, about the existence of patent rights on certain active ingredients.

On the other hand, according to the amended Rules for Health Supplies, when filing an application with the FDA for marketing authorization of a drug, the applicant must state either there is no patent protection for the drug, or that it is the patent holder or recorded licensee. The Mexican FDA has to review the List of Patented Medicines and even verify with the MPTO to make sure that there would be no patent infringement if it grants the marketing authorization to the applicant. If necessary, the Mexican FDA will request the applicant to provide evidence that it is the patent owner or that it has a license recorded with the MPTO.

The disputes around the linkage system

It was clear that patents claiming new active ingredients should be included in the List of Patented Medicines, and that patents claiming processes were not to be listed.

However, there were a lot of questions about patents for new compositions or formulations and new uses. The language used when amending the Rules of the Industrial Property Law raised some doubts, although the amended Rules for Health Supplies only considers patents claiming new active ingredients as subject of being included in the List of Patented Medicines.

The original position of the MPTO was that new pharmaceutial formulations and compositions should not be included in the List of Patented Medicines. It did not mean that is was ok to infringe patents claiming new formulations or processes, but that the mechanism provided by the linkage system only benefited patents that claimed new active compounds.

Many innovative pharmaceutical laboratories starting filing amparos or constitutional appeals with the district courts in Mexico City against the lack of inclusion of their formulation patents in the List of Patented Medicines, and in most cases the patent owners prevailed, so the MPTO has been forced to publish several addenda to the List of Patented Medicines to include patents for new formulations and compositions.

Although most federal courts of appeals in Mexico City supported the idea that the  List of Patented Medicines should include patents for new formulations, the Fourth Court of Appeals in Mexico City published a ruling[1], stating that only patents on new active ingredients should be included in the List of Patented Medicines.

The expansion of the linkage system

The contradictory rulings between different courts of appeals caused the intervention of the Supreme Court shortly after the Fourth Court of Appeals in Mexico City published the ruling. On January 2010, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, specialized in administrative matters, published binding precedent number 2a./J. 7/2010[2], stating that the List of Patented Medicines should include patents claiming new formulations in a very close decision (3 Judges in favor and 2 Judges against).

n the Mexican system, a binding decision from the Supreme Court is binding for all federal, state and administrative courts in Mexico, but not for the MPTO. Technically, the MPTO could continue refusing to include patented formulations in the List of Patented Medicines and the owners of the excluded patents would have to appeal such exclusions, although such appeals should be decided quicker than before the Supreme Court’s decision.

Notwithstanding the above, the MPTO usually tries to adapt its actions and decisions to the binding precedents of the courts, so I would expect that the MPTO will voluntarily include patents on new pharmaceutical compositions and formulations in the next number of the List of Patented Medicines. The ruling of the Supreme Court did not mention patents for new uses of drugs, and we may exact the MPTO to continue opposing the publication of these patents in the List of Patented Medicines.

(Update September 20, 2018. Several decisions from the federal courts of appeals show that the courts favor the publication of second use patents in the linkage system. No  binding precedent has been issued).

Some downside of the linkage system and its expansion

All measures and mechanisms to improve the protection of patents and prevent the infringement are welcome. However, the linkage system and the expansion ruled by the Supreme Court could lead to unfair decisions.

First, and this has nothing to do with including formulation patents in the List of Patented Medicines, I am against the fact that the Rules for Health Supplies force applicants for marketing authorizations to prove that they are the patent owner or a recorded licensee. Why there should be a license and why it should be recorded? If the applicant for the marketing authorization is just distributor, there is no reason for the parties to execute a license; however the Mexican FDA will still demand evidence that the applicant has a license recorded with the MPTO in order to issue the marketing authorization. From my perspective, the demand stated in the Rules for Health Supplies about the existence of a license recorded with the MPTO shows that neither the Mexican FDA not the MPTO understood the legal consequences of recording a license. It also evidences the extremely formalistic mentality of the Mexican bureaucrats and society in general.

Second, considering the restrictive construction that the MPTO originally made of the amended Rules of the Industrial Property Law about what patents should be included in the List of Patented Medicines, I believe that it was not the original intention of the Administration to benefit formulation patents from the linkage system. I think that the courts have been able to expand the system to formulation patents mainly because the lousy language used in the 2003 amendment to the Rules of the Industrial Property Law.

The fact that the Rules for Health Supplies were amended at the same time than the Rules of the Industrial Property Law and that the Rules for Health Supplies clearly limit the scope of the linkage system to patents claiming an active ingredient somehow confirms the above.

Third, the inclusion of formulation patents in the List of Patented Medicines, although it may be a very effective way to prevent infringement of such patents, it may also cause the rejection of marketing authorizations for drugs that use a formulation different from the one claimed in the patent. Unlike many cases of patents claiming active ingredients, the Mexican FDA may have to interpret the claims of the formulation patent to decide whether the applied drug infringes said claims. This is dangerous, because the Mexican FDA is not a patent expert, and it is unclear whether if the MPTO would be able to provide effective, timely and accurate support in this field.

Does it make sense for a non-innovative country such as Mexico to increase the protection to pharmaceutical patents at the risk of blocking non-infringing drugs?

[1] “PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL. LAS PATENTES DE MEDICAMENTOS ALOPÁTICOS QUE DEBEN PUBLICARSE EN LA GACETA RELATIVA, DEBEN SER ÚNICAMENTE AQUELLAS QUE PROTEGEN UNA SUSTANCIA, INGREDIENTE O PRINCIPIO ACTIVO”, at Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Ninth Era, Tome XXIX, May 2009, page 1092.|

[2] “PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL. LAS PATENTES DE MEDICAMENTOS ALOPÁTICOS O SUS REIVINDICACIONES QUE NO CONSTITUYAN PROCESOS DE PRODUCCIÓN O DE FORMULACIÓN DE MEDICAMENTOS Y QUE EN SU COMPOSICIÓN FARMACÉUTICA INCLUYAN UN INGREDIENTE, SUSTANCIA O PRINCIPIO ACTIVO, DEBEN INCLUIRSE EN LA PUBLICACIÓN A QUE SE REFIERE EL ARTÍCULO 47 BIS DEL REGLAMENTO DE LA LEY DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL”, at Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Ninth Era, Tome XXXI, February 2010, page 135.

La entrada The Mexican Supreme Court expands the linkage system to prevent patent infringement se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.

The decisions of the FCTAA have made the Mexican Patent and Trademark Office (MPTO) to acknowledge the extension of term of several pipe-line patents, for the same extended term granted to the corresponding foreign patent from which the priority was claimed. Further, the decisions of the Highest Chamber of the FCTAA allowing the extension of term are now binding*. For a more detailed explanation about Mexican pipe-line patents and their extension, you may review the post  The extension of life of patents in Mexico.

In spite of the relatively large number of extended pipe-line patents, all the controversy surrounding the pipe-line patents themselves and their life extensions and that the FCTAA published the first precedent regarding this matter in 2005, neither the Federal Courts of Appeals nor the Supreme Court had published any ruling concerning the term extension of pipe-line patents, until January 2010.

The January 2010 issue of the Weekly Judicial Journal of the Federation publishes a non-binding decision of he First Court of Appeals in Administrative Matters of the First Circuit (based in Mexico City)**. This decision is associated to a final appeal (Amparo Directo) filed by the well-known Mexican pharmaceutical company Probiomed, S.A. de C.V. The decision rules that the term of pipe-line patents, and of all patents in general, cannot be extended whatsoever. This decision is in open conflict with the binding ruling of the FCTAA, and restarts a discussion that I thought was (a few technicalities aside) essentially over, as a consequence of the binding precedent from the FCTAA and because all pipe-line patents, even the extended ones, should expire by mid 2012 (the statute provided that no pipe-line patent could have a term longer than 20 years counted from the filing date in Mexico).

Notwithstanding the above, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeals does not imply an actual change in the way Transitory Article Twelve of the 1991 Industrial Property Statute has been understood, particularly concerning the extension of pipe-line patents.

The decision of the First Court of Appeals in Mexico City is non binding (the binding precedents of the Highest Chamber of the FCTAA are not binding for  the District Courts and Courts of Appeals, only for the different lower Chambers of the FCTAA), so there is no reason for the Specialized Chamber in Intellectual Property of the FCTAA to stop following the binding decision of the Highest Chamber of the FCTAA and continue ordering the MPTO to acknowledge the term extension of pipe-line patents when the foreign patent offices grant the term extension of the foreign patent that corresponds to the claimed priority in the Mexican pipe-line patent.

We have to wait to see if the precedent from the First Court of Appeals in Mexico City causes the intervention of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may intervene if there is a contradictory ruling from another Court of Appeals. I believe that at least the first decision of the Highest Chamber of the FCTAA allowing the extension of term of a pipe-line patent (precedent V-P-SS-629, decided on July 7, 2004) was appealed by the MPTO and a Court of Appeals had to decide based on the merits of the appeal (the statute changed in December 2005; since then, most appeals of the MPTO against the decisions of the FCTAA are dismissed).

Not everybody is allowed to demand the intervention of the Supreme Court to decide which of the contradictory decisions held by different courts of appeals is right, but the MPTO can. I hope that the MPTO, or the parties involved in the appeals, will soon demand such intervention of the Supreme Court, so we may have certainty about the validity of the term extension of Mexican pipe-line patents. (Update January 2011: Unfortunately, as a result of some formal flaws in the appeal brief that the MPTO filed against the first decision of the Highest Chamber of the FCTAA of 2004, the Federal Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal without reviewing the merits, thus the intervention of the Supreme Court, will take more time to occur, if ever).

* Jurisprudencia or binding decision VI-J-SS-40. Journal of the Federal Court of Tax and Administrative Affairs, Sixth Era, Year II, No. 21, September 2009, page 27.

** Isolated precedent published in the Weekly Judicial Journal of the Federation, Ninth Era, Courts of Appeals, XXXI, January 2010, page 2173.

La entrada Mexican courts disagree about the term extension of patents se publicó primero en Reyes Fenig.